Recommendations for updating the Digital Decade on international cooperation

This document is based on an analysis of, inter alia, the State of the Digital Decade 2024 report [1], the Draghi report[2], the Competitiveness Compass[3], the EuroStack report[4], and the White Paper on Defence Readiness 2030[5] (including ReArm Europe and SAFE – Security Action for Europe). Recommendations for international cooperation to update the Digital Decade were derived from this analysis.


International aspects of focus areas and recommendations for action

In their sections on digital international relations, both the Digital Decade report and the EuroStack study promote enhanced relations with like-minded countries. The aim of these initiatives is to promote European capacities and capabilities in the field of digital technology and to enhance European competitiveness.

The build-up of digital and other high technology plays an increasing role in Europe's defence capability. As such, Digital Decade and EuroStack also contribute to the aims of the ReArm Europe Plan / Readiness 2030 and the Safe Regulation. But being able to defend themselves also means that European countries are capable to deter and thwart aggression from state and non-state actors. In terms of Europe's external relations these ambitions translate in two groups: those regarded as partners and those regarded as opponents. This is not as simple as it sounds.

So far, countries like the UK, Norway, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea are considered partners, while Russia, North Korea, Iran and China are regarded as enemies or opponents. An important third category are BRIC countries like India, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia. And yet another, for different reasons, the United States – until recently in many aspects the major partner.

The nature of the relationships the EU has with these different categories of countries are a function of the EU's ambitions for cooperation and the necessity to protect itself. As far as cooperation is concerned, a key element is the level of dependency that is acceptable in the field of digital technology and in the field of security and defence.

In this context, the notion of 'like-mindedness' needs to be urgently reviewed and made more explicit, as for example the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 Date: 2 April 2025 2


mentions as one of the key lines of action "Strengthening partnership with like-minded countries around the world."

Aims

The efforts of international cooperation in the framework of the Digital Decade focus on:

  1. promoting the EU human centric model and regulatory framework,
  2. protecting the EU's strategic interests including EU economic security and
  3. reinforcing the global role of the EU in the digital world


The EuroStack complements this with:

  • reducing dependencies,
  • safeguarding its strategic assets, and
  • strengthening domestic capabilities
  • fostering industrial champions, and
  • driving competitiveness in critical technologies such as AI, semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, and IoT.


Over and above the Digital Decade, the EuroStack strategy aims to support:

1. Economic resilience: Creating high-skilled jobs, reducing dependencies, and supporting critical industries like healthcare, manufacturing, and energy.

2. Strategic leadership: Positioning Europe as a leader in the world in values-driven, citizen centric digital innovation.

3)Technological independence: Building a sustainable, interoperable digital ecosystem rooted in European values of privacy, transparency, and trust.

Internationally, Europe should prioritize partnership alliances that: share its values, respect international rules, and aspire to balanced, inclusive and resilient digital ecosystems. NB: an important partner and a specific case is the United Kingdom.

Recommendations on external relations in the digital field, including related to defence cooperation[6]


Capital for digital competitiveness

  • Sovereign Wealth Funds are financial instruments acting as strategic levers capable of shaping technological standards, securing supply chains, and gaining a decisive edge in the global competition for digital dominance and power projection.
  • European countries should adopt a more strategic 'pooled' SWF model, prioritizing investments in critical technologies such as AI, semiconductors, and quantum computing to strengthen its digital sovereignty. The German decision to vastly expand public financing to increase competitiveness and the policies and actions of the Trump administration mark a unique moment to create an unprecedented upswing in investment.
  • In addition, Member States should explore options of pooling of SWF resources, combined with an expansion of the VC ecosystem in coordination with the market to attract more strategic investments in transformative technologies and keep start-ups in Europe. Apart from the BU and the CMU, this requires a new form of public-private coordination.
  • The defence funding instruments mentioned in the ReArm Europe plan (SGP escape clause, SAFE regulation and EIB) including possibilities for common procurement with candidate- and accession countries can contribute to more financing options for digital competitiveness.


Countries considered partners: Norway, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, UK

  • Recent geopolitical developments force the EU and its Member States to re-assess the concept of like-mindedness, in particular with regard to the US, but also – for example – to the BRIC countries.
  • Strengthen digital partnerships and activities in the framework of Trade and Technology Councils.
  • Work towards the conclusion of a Security and Defence Partnership with the UK and create agreements to expand cooperation towards external crisis management and defence industrial policies.
  • Explore opportunities for defence-industrial cooperation, e.g. with Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
  • Further enhance cooperation with Canada on the (upcoming) Security and Defence Partnership and initiatives to boost defence industrial production.
  • Fully use the possibilities of the recently launched Security and Defence Partnership with Norway.
  • Create binding digital trade rules on market access and secure data flows.
  • Step up technology exchange, where applicable also in the field of security and defence and the security of communications.
  • On the basis of "mutual benefit, mutual security" increase cooperation and exchange across the entire field of digital security issues, from enhancing societal resilience to the capabilities and use of digital in defense.
  • The same goes for the security of communications (e.g. fiber-optic land and sub-sea cables)
  • Explore building a 'connected space' of capacities and capabilities in semiconductor development and production, cloud, talent exchange, and digital Sovereign Wealth Fund development.


Neighbourhood

  • Continue engagement and cooperation in the field of security and defence with "all like-minded, enlargement and neighbouring countries (Albania, Iceland, Montenegro, Moldova, North Macedonia and Switzerland) to promote peace, security and stability.


India

  • Step up ongoing efforts in the TTC, with a particular focus on talent exchange, research cooperation, mutual learning on large-scale digital ecosystems and projects in joint innovation areas such as fintech. health tech and interoperable digital services.
  • Increasingly include security issues and societal resilience. Actively explore the role of digital in defense as well as India's growing capabilities in the development of AI and the production of semiconductors.
  • Further explore and work towards the conclusion of a Security and Defence Partnership.


Brazil

  • Focus on cooperation in: scaling user-driven financial solutions / financial services, digital applications in agriculture and healthcare, integrating AI into broader industrial policies and addressing supply chain dependencies and aligning with EU privacy standards.
  • Prioritize measurable objectives, particularly in diversifying semiconductor supply chains, fostering interoperable and independent digital systems, and advancing AI governance.
  • Collaborative efforts should also address shared challenges such as financial inclusion and climate adaptation.


African countries

  • Key areas of collaboration – for example in the framework of Global Gateway - to continue and to be given high priority.
  • Step up high-tech R&D cooperation, with South Africa serving as the EU's largest research and innovation partner on the continent.
  • Enhance digital and legislative capacity-building, as exemplified by cooperation with Ghana;
  • Increase the number of digital infrastructure development projects, including undersea cables and related operational capabilities, such as projects with Senegal.
  • Develop rare mineral / critical raw material exploration activities sync with exploration in Europe (including Norway). The Democratic Republic of Congo is of particular importance.
  • Extend and securitize communications networks (land, sea, space) for a broad range of African countries.


Gulf Countries

  • Leverage through 'constructive collaboration' the financial power of countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar to create shared concepts for data governance and exchange, sustainable urban planning and renewable energy technologies, aligning innovation with shared values of transparency and sustainability.
  • Work with the countries in the Gulf region (GCC) to explore mutual interests in closer cooperation, in particular in the fast-developing Cloud, HPC and AI sector, benefitting from the availability of capital en clean energy.


Türkiye

  • Continuation of activities in the framework of NATO and constructive engagement to "develop a mutually beneficial partnership on all issues of importance to the EU".


The United States

  • Europe will take more responsibility for its own defence. These efforts shall continue to build on the deep and extensive transatlantic supply chain, which should be mutually beneficial. The bilateral dialogue on Security and Defence can be enhanced to further strengthen cooperation in fields such as cyber, maritime security and space, discuss procurement issues and tackle any other matters of mutual concern.


1 European Commission, 'Report on the State of the Digital Decade 2024 | Shaping Europe's Digital Future'.

2 Mario Draghi, 'The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe'. 

3 European Commission, 'Competitiveness Compass'. 

4 Bria, Timmers, and Gernone, 'EuroStack – A European Alternative for Digital Sovereignty'. 

5 EC, 'White Paper on the Future of European Defence - Rearming Europe; Security Action for Europe - SAFE Regulation; Increase Defence Expenditure within the Stability and Growth Pact - European Commission'.

6 Does not include suggestions for cooperation with regard to (hybrid) threats from state and non-state actors, and threats from Russia, Iran and China. 

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